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Recalibrational theoryAccording to the recalibrational theory of anger, anger is a computationally complex cognitive system
that evolved to bargain for better treatment. Anger coordinates facial expressions, vocal changes, verbal
arguments, the withholding of benefits, the deployment of aggression, and a suite of other cognitive and
physiological variables in the service of leveraging bargaining position into better outcomes. The proto-
typical trigger of anger is an indication that the offender places too little weight on the angry individual’s
welfare when making decisions, i.e. the offender has too low a welfare tradeoff ratio (WTR) toward the
angry individual. Twenty-three experiments in six cultures, including a group of foragers in the
Ecuadorian Amazon, tested six predictions about the computational structure of anger derived from
the recalibrational theory. Subjects judged that anger would intensify when: (i) the cost was large, (ii)
the benefit the offender received from imposing the cost was small, or (iii) the offender imposed the cost
despite knowing that the angered individual was the person to be harmed. Additionally, anger-based
arguments conformed to a conceptual grammar of anger, such that offenders were inclined to argue that
they held a high WTR toward the victim, e.g., ‘‘the cost I imposed on you was small”, ‘‘the benefit I gained
was large”, or ‘‘I didn’t know it was you I was harming.” These results replicated across all six tested cul-
tures: the US, Australia, Turkey, Romania, India, and Shuar hunter-horticulturalists in Ecuador. Results
contradict key predictions about anger based on equity theory and social constructivism.
 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Anger is a complex neural system that orchestrates behavior,
physiology, facial and vocal expressions, perceptual changes, moti-
vational priorities, memory, attention, and energy regulation in
response to interpretations of social events (Fessler, 2010;
Lazarus, 1991; Potegal, Stemmler, & Spielberger, 2010; Sell,
2011a; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). This
system is instantiated in a network of brain regions (Kragel &
LaBar, 2016), shows early ontogenetic development (e.g. the angerface is functional at six months; Stenberg, Campos, & Emde, 1983),
and demonstrates cross-cultural uniformity in basic design
(Alonso-Arbiol et al., 2011; Ekman, 1973; Wallbott & Scherer,
1986). Furthermore, some features of anger are known to develop
without exposure to the information that would be required to
learn them through more general purpose systems, e.g., congeni-
tally blind children produce normal anger facial expressions
(Galati, Sini, Schmidt, & Tinti, 2003). This evidence fits with the
generally accepted conclusion that anger is – at least in part – a
species-typical system designed by natural selection (Potegal
et al., 2010; though see Barrett, 2017).
If anger did indeed evolve by natural selection, then identifying
the function of anger (i.e., the way in which it increased the
fitness of our ancestors) should predict and explain the
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the function of mate choice has allowed evolutionary psychologists
to explain the complexly organized nature of attractiveness (e.g.
Sugiyama, 2005).
The recalibrational theory holds that anger evolved to bargain
for better treatment. This theory was first derived from basic prin-
ciples of evolutionary biology, including the theory of bargaining
and game theory (Sell, 2006; Sell, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2009), which
argue that organisms have two fundamental tools to bargain for
better outcomes: conditional aggression (threat), or conditional
cooperation (contingent benefit delivery). With these, organisms
can incentivize the other party to shift their behavior in a way that
is favorable to the bargainer. This underlying theoretical approach
to bargaining was combined with a leading evolutionary approach
to emotions, which holds that the neural basis of any specific emo-
tion is conceptualized as a superordinate control program that
evolved to orchestrate the diverse mechanisms in the organism
into a best-bet configuration to respond to an evolutionarily recur-
rent adaptive problem (Sell et al., 2009; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990,
2008).
The function identified by the recalibrational theory of anger is
to resolve conflicts of interest more in favor of the angry individual.
That is, the anger system was designed by natural selection to
orchestrate the subcomponents of the organism’s architecture
(e.g. physiology, behavior, cognitive structures) in order to leverage
its bargaining advantages over another organism and incentivize
that organism to place more weight on the angry individual’s wel-
fare. Informally, the signal is (in cooperative relationships) do more
of what I want or I will do less of what you want, and (in noncooper-
ative relationships) do more of what I want or I will inflict costs on
you.
Elsewhere we have more fully derived this adaptationist theory
of the design of anger from basic principles (Sell, 2006; Sell et al.,
2009; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). In this paper, we add to this by
examining how some of the major features of anger support the
hypothesis that they evolved in the service of bargaining for better
treatment (Sections 1.1 and 1.2). We then use the theory to gener-
ate six hypotheses about the triggers of anger (Section 1.4), and
experimentally test themwith vignettes in six cultures. Predictions
#1 through #3 relate to the computational structure of the triggers
of anger; predictions #4 through #6 relate to how people argue
over an incident of anger.
1.1. The recalibrational theory as a guide to reverse engineering anger
According to the recalibrational theory of anger (Sell, 2006,
2011a, 2011b; Sell et al., 2009; Tooby, Cosmides, Sell,
Lieberman, & Sznycer, 2008) anger is designed to bargain for
better treatment. Thus, anger has features designed to gather
the attention of the target and interact with that target in ways
that – if successful – incline the target to behave in a way that
more highly values the angry person’s interests in the present
or future. Indeed, the major features of anger are all consistent
with this function (see also Sell, 2011a, 2011b; Sell et al.,
2009):
1.1.1. The major triggers of anger are cues of the target’s motivational
state
The most common triggers of anger are cues about what might
loosely be identified as the intentions and beliefs of the target of
anger; and experiments reveal that it is these intentions and
beliefs that trigger anger more than any particular tangible harm
(Averill, 1982; Epstein & Taylor, 1967; Ohbuchi & Kambara, 1985;
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Furthermore, anger-based aggression
typically results from the revelation that the target of anger does
not ‘‘respect” the angry individual rather than any specific harmdone (Daly & Wilson, 1988; Felson, 1982). (Here, we interpret
‘‘respect” to mean the weight placed on the actor’s welfare.)
Finally, anger focuses attention on cues of the target’s mental
state which is often probed directly, i.e. the targets of anger are
frequently interrogated about why they did what they did
(Averill, 1982). In sum, anger is activated by cues of what the tar-
get thinks of the angry person and the importance of their affairs.
These are indispensable design features we would expect in a sys-
tem designed to recalibrate a target’s propensity to place weight
on the actor’s interests.
1.1.2. Anger is designed to gather the target’s attention
An adaptation designed to recalibrate a target’s mind must
seek out that target. Therefore, anger – particularly in the early
stages of its deployment– motivates approach toward the target
of anger (an anomaly among negatively valenced emotions;
Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009). Furthermore, anger signals its
onset to the target with a highly recognizable (Fox et al.,
2000; Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001) and universal facial
expression (Ekman, 1973). According to the recalibrational the-
ory, the anger expression is the signal that the target’s action
expresses too little weight—that is, is an unacceptably low
‘‘bid”, and that this bid is rejected. Finally, during aggressive
bargaining, the anger face triggers muscles in the face that
enhance cues of physical strength and fighting ability (Sell,
Cosmides, & Tooby, 2014) in a way analogous to non-human
animals that bare their fangs or inflate their lungs as threats
to aggression.
1.1.3. The most common response to anger is rapid information
exchange
Once anger has motivated the actor to gather the attention of
the target, it enacts strategies designed to interface with and
recalibrate cognitive structures in the target (Averill, 1982,
1983). This is usually done by rapid, focused communication
with the target, e.g., an argument or a display. During these
arguments, anger modifies the voice in ways that generally
increase the speed and salience of speech (Banse & Scherer,
1996), and signal through increasing volume and roughening of
the voice the activation of the sympathetic pathways involved
in preparation for combat. This communication should be rele-
vant to the bargaining dynamics between the two individuals,
based on the ability to confer benefits, or to inflict harms
(aggression). The angry individual should emphasize that the
offense placed too little weight on their welfare, given the ben-
efit to the offender. Other relevant features are the importance
of the benefits that the angry individual has conferred previ-
ously, or could withhold. If the two are not in a cooperative rela-
tionship, then the angry individual could emphasize his ability to
inflict costs (demonstrate formidability) by e.g., pounding a
table, shaking a fist, breaking something, or striking the target
(see Section 4).
1.1.4. Anger-based aggression is largely communicative
Although anger usually does not lead to aggression (Averill,
1983), when it does, the design of this aggression is communica-
tive in nature; in other words, the aggression does not efficiently
injure or kill the target, but instead demonstrates fighting ability,
determination, or the willingness to take the interaction into the
realm of physical harm. An incident of anger-based aggression typ-
ically starts with aggressive signaling, will dissipate if the target
retreats or submits, and escalates from less dangerous to more
dangerous aggressive acts only if the target retaliates or fails to
conciliate (Felson, 1982). Thus, anger-based aggression typically
appears designed to recalibrate the target rather than incapacitate
or kill.
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If the function of anger is to bargain for better treatment by
recalibrating the mind of the target, anger should be designed
to turn off when this has been accomplished, just as hunger is
switched off after feeding. Indeed, the best method of defusing
an incidence of anger is to offer a sincere verbal indicator of
internal recalibration (i.e. an apology, Frantz & Bennigson,
2005; Ohbuchi, Kameda, & Agarie, 1989). Apologies are
effective even when the target offers no tangible recompense,
indicating that the function of anger is not just to get
immediate access to resources but rather to recalibrate the
target’s mind so that the future propensity of the target to take
the angry individual’s interests into account has reached an
acceptable level.
Together, this evidence suggests that anger is a complex system
that is triggered by implicit calculations about the contents of the
target’s mind typically revealed during a conflict. Anger opens a
channel with the target by gathering their attention and then
delivers (and receives) relevant information (verbal and otherwise)
until the target has been recalibrated.
We can derive a more computationally-specific account of
anger if we know exactly what computational structures in the tar-
get’s mind are being recalibrated by anger. According to the recal-
ibrational theory, anger primarily bargains by recalibrating a
cognitive structure called the welfare tradeoff ratio (WTR) (Sell,
2006, 2011a, 2011b; Sell et al., 2009; Tooby et al., 2008). A welfare
tradeoff ratio is, by hypothesis, an internal regulatory variable
(Tooby et al., 2008)1 that governs how much an individual weights
another’s welfare against her own when making decisions.2 The
higher one’s WTR toward another individual, the more weight one
puts on their welfare when making decisions. Because anger is pri-
marily designed to recalibrate this variable, understanding the com-
putational structure of the welfare tradeoff ratio will explain the
features of anger in the same way that the structure of a lock
explains the features of a key.1.2. The computational structure of the welfare tradeoff function
Humans must make decisions that jointly impact the wel-
fare (positively and negatively) of self and others. As with
other animals, natural selection would be expected to shape
adaptations that govern when an individual should sacrifice
their own welfare to benefit another, and when they should
sacrifice another’s welfare to benefit themselves (Sell et al.,
2009). Biologists have identified a number of different selection
pressures that, when the right conditions are satisfied, favor an
organism placing at least some weight on another’s interests at
the expense of their own (e.g. parenting, genetic kinship,
future value in a cooperative relationship, threats of punish-
ment or aggressive extortion, joint coalitional membership;
for discussion see Tooby et al., 2008). Each of these may be
thought of as evolutionarily repeated games, which have best
bet strategies given the situation of the players. We expect
these strategies will predict the motivational subsystems of1 Internal regulatory variables are structures in an organism that store information
needed to effectively calibrate emotions and motivational systems so that they
regulate the organism’s behavior functionally. For example, an organism’s detection
of its blood sugar regulates feeding, and a kinship index tracks genetic relatedness and
so generates sexual revulsion at close genetic relatives, and directs altruism toward
them (Tooby et al., 2008). They do not correspond to beliefs and intentions as
ordinarily construed.
2 Some prefer the term ‘‘welfare tradeoff parameterization” or WTP rather than
‘‘welfare tradeoff ratio” so as not to imply a constant ratio across all magnitudes of
conflict; e.g. someone could weight their friend’s welfare equal to their own when
deciding who gets the closest parking space but not when deciding who gets the
promotion.humans when facing these situations. While these selection
pressures are modeled one by one, real organisms may be
faced with familiar social others with whom they are playing
several games at once, and so these best-bet strategies must
be integrated to decide how to partition decisions where the
favored outcome is benefiting the other person (benefit-
delivery) from decisions where the favored outcome is benefit-
ting oneself (‘‘selfish” action). This requires a neurocomputa-
tional program that integrates various relevant factors and
generates output – for a given decision set– reflecting how
much consideration an individual will place on the welfare of
that other person. We call the function that does this input-
output mapping the ‘‘welfare tradeoff function”, and call its
output the welfare tradeoff ratio (WTR) (Petersen, Sell, Tooby,
& Cosmides, 2010; Sell, 2006, 2011b; Sell et al., 2009; Tooby
et al., 2008).
The welfare tradeoff ratio specifies the threshold for an
acceptable cost-benefit transaction with another individual, such
that for agent X with respect to Y, WTRXY = benefit to X/cost to
Y for a specific range of conditions. The WTRXY indicates the
cost-benefit transaction below which X will refrain from impos-
ing the cost on Y, but above which X will impose the cost on Y;
in colloquial terms, it represents how much X ‘‘cares” about Y’s
welfare when making decisions that impact them both. Thus, if
agent X held a WTR toward agent Y of 1/2, then X would
impose a cost of 2 on Y in order to benefit 1, but would not
impose a cost of 9 in order to benefit 4. WTRs are person-
specific, however, so that one will likely have high WTRs toward
cooperative partners, close relatives, and powerful others, but
low WTRs (or even negative WTRs) toward enemies, strangers,
and competitors.
The evolved function of the welfare tradeoff ratio is to regu-
late cost/benefit transactions between the individual and speci-
fic others in ways that were, over evolutionary time, fitness
promoting to the individual holding the WTR, e.g. to care suffi-
ciently about one’s friend but not to a self-destructive degree,
to defer sufficiently but not excessively to a dominant group
member, and so on. To do this, an individual’s welfare tradeoff
function would need to: (i) estimate variables that predicted
the ancestral fitness consequences of helping or harming
another under a given set of conditions and (ii) calibrate the
WTR toward that person in response to those estimates in
accordance with the best-bet strategies of the relevant evolu-
tionary games or functions. For example, because of the genet-
ics of sexual reproduction described by kin selection theory,
individuals are adapted to deliver benefits to kin at a cost to
themselves (Hamilton, 1964). Therefore, there must exist a sys-
tem that perceives evolutionarily reliable, cues of kinship, (such
as maternal-perinatal association and duration of childhood
coresidency), and then upregulates the individual’s WTR toward
individuals the system has classified as close genetic relatives
(Lieberman, Tooby, & Cosmides, 2007; Sznycer, De Smet,
Billingsley, & Lieberman, 2016). This raised WTR causes the
actor to place a greater weight on the welfare of their kin when
making decisions about whether to help or harm them (see
Madsen et al., 2007).
Here we focus on welfare tradeoffs that are hypothesized to
be calibrated by bargaining power, e.g. the ability to cost-
effectively confer or withdraw benefits and impose costs. For
example, models of animal conflict show that relative fighting
ability (i.e., formidability) partly determines the costs of exploit-
ing others and the costs of resisting exploitation from others
(Alcock, 2005; Hammerstein & Parker, 1982; Huntingford &
Turner, 1987; Maynard Smith & Parker, 1976). Therefore,
humans – and many other animals – evolved perceptual mech-
anisms designed to assess cues of formidability in the body,
Fig. 1. A lower WTRxy is indicated as C(y) increases and B(x) decreases.
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cues by calibrating welfare tradeoff ratios such that males
who are better fighters are expected – by themselves and
others – to receive greater consideration (Delton & Sell, 2014;
Hess, Helfrecht, Hagen, Sell, & Hewlett, 2010; Lukaszewski,
2013; Petersen, Sznycer, Sell, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2013;
Pietraszewski & Shaw, 2015; Sell et al., 2009; Thomsen,
Frankenhuis, Ingold-Smith, & Carey, 2011). Similar cue-based
computational systems underlie reciprocity, prestige and deep-
engagement friendships that calibrate welfare tradeoff ratios
to the ecology of human cooperation (Delton & Robertson,
2016; Kirkpatrick, Delton, Robertson, & de Wit, 2015;
Komorita, Parks, & Hulbert, 1992; Petersen, Sell, Tooby, &
Cosmides, 2012; Sell et al., 2009; Sznycer et al., 2012; Tooby
& Cosmides, 1996).
In conclusion, an individual will have different welfare trade-
off ratios for different individuals, such that more formidable
people, relatives, reciprocity partners, and those with high coop-
erative value will have their welfare valued more highly – all
else equal. Welfare tradeoff ratios thus underlie folk notions of
respect, deference, dominance, love, and friendship, but are
derived from evolutionary theory and formalized so as to allow
for more precise computational predictions that do not rely on
intuition or folk psychology. With this understanding of the
computational nature of the welfare tradeoff system, we can
make more specific predictions about how anger functions to
recalibrate WTRs.
1.3. Welfare tradeoff ratios and the recalibrational theory of anger
The recalibrational theory holds that anger is a neurocognitive
system that evolved primarily to bargain for better treatment from
those who reveal in their behavior that their welfare tradeoff ratios
toward the offended individual are lower than they ‘‘ought” to be
given the history of the negotiated relationship and the relative
power of the interactants (Sell, 2011b; Sell et al., 2009). Thus, anger
is triggered when it detects that the other party is not placing suf-
ficient weight on the welfare of the actor. More specifically, the
anger system compares the target’s apparent WTR – estimated
from behavioral cues – (i.e., the observed WTR) to the WTR that
the angry person feels entitled to from that person (i.e., expected
WTR). If the observed WTR is lower than the expected WTR, anger
is triggered.
Once activated, the anger program opens a channel for com-
munication with the target, and feeds information to the target’s
WTR-setting cognitive system. Because WTRs are calibrated by
estimates of bargaining power such as physical formidability,
ability to confer benefits, cooperative reliability, coalitional sup-
port, and so on (Lukaszewski, 2013; Sell, Eisner, & Ribeaud,
2016; Sell et al., 2009; Tooby et al., 2008), anger can recalibrate
the target’s WTR by demonstrating the willingness and ability
of the angry person to inflict costs (i.e., aggression) or withhold
or curtail benefits (Sell, 2011b; Sell et al., 2009; Williams,
Shore, & Grahe, 1998). This is why anger-based aggression is
communicative in nature (see Section 1.1.4). These strategies
are designed to recalibrate the WTR of the target by showing
them that they will be worse off – in the long run – by continuing
to behave in ways that place too little weight on the angry per-
son’s welfare (for related arguments see Frank, 1988;
Hirshleifer, 1984).
In conclusion, by identifying the aspects of natural selection
that led to the evolution of the human anger system, the recal-
ibrational theory enables the mapping of the computational
structure of anger, including its input conditions. In short, it
can explain how anger is triggered, which appraisals lead to
anger, and why.1.4. Triggers of anger
According to this theory, the primary activating conditions for
anger will be cues that indicate another individual maintains a
lower welfare tradeoff ratio than is acceptable given their negoti-
ated relationship. These cues exist in many formats because the
WTR is likely to be used by many different motivational, emo-
tional, and cognitive mechanisms. That is, how much weight a per-
son puts on another’s welfare may leak through many channels.
For example, the degree to which one values the welfare of another
presumably regulates the fidelity of memory encoding such that
information about an individual who is highly valued is more likely
to be remembered. Thus, ignorance about a person can indicate a
low WTR toward that person and activate anger in them. Similar
indications of low WTRs can come from infrequent consideration
of the individual’s interests (‘‘Why don’t you ever ask what I
want?”), a low evaluation of an individual on a trait that is relevant
to the calibration of WTRs such as intelligence or physical
formidability in men (Harris, 1993; Preston & Kimberley, 1987),
and a lack of empathic feelings, i.e. being uninterested in a person’s
pain or joy (Lanzetta & Englis, 1989). That said, the most common
trigger of anger is a cost imposition (Averill, 1982, 1983).
1.4.1. Cost impositions as indicators of WTR
When an individual imposes a cost on another in order to
receive a benefit (hereafter termed a ‘‘cost-benefit transaction”),
the imposer indicates the upper bound of their welfare tradeoff
ratio toward the individual on whom the cost was imposed. Specif-
ically, when actor X imposes a cost on Y in order to receive a ben-
efit, the highest WTR X could have toward Y (i.e. WTRXY) is:
(benefit to X)/(cost to Y). Thus, the upper bound of the WTR that
X has toward Y becomes lower as the cost imposed on Y increases
and the benefit X receives as a result of that cost decreases. See
Fig. 1. Put simply, an individual demonstrates that they value your
welfare less when they are willing to impose large costs on you in
order to benefit a small amount.
This leads to two predictions about how cost impositions trig-
ger anger:
 Prediction #1: Holding the benefit the offender received con-
stant, anger will become more intense as the cost imposed on
the angry person increases.
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become less intense as the benefit the target received increases.
Prediction #1 has been demonstrated in the established litera-
ture across many types of costs; e.g., voltage of electric shocks
(O’Leary and Dengerink, 1973), monetary costs (Fehr & Gaechter,
2000). Prediction #2, however, is not established and is directly
contrary to the predictions of some theories of anger, such as
equity theory (see Section 6). Experiment Set A was designed as
a cross-cultural test of this prediction.
Furthermore, because welfare tradeoff ratios are person-
specific, the imposition of a large cost for a small benefit will
clearly indicate a low WTR toward an individual only if it was
known by the actor that the cost would be imposed on that specific
individual (see Section 3 for more details). This leads to another
key prediction:
 Prediction #3: Holding the costs and benefits constant, anger
will be more intense when the offender deliberately imposes
the cost on the angry individual as opposed to imposing the cost
at random.
Experiment Set B was designed as a cross-cultural test of pre-
diction #3.
Finally, if these predictions hold, one would expect that targets
of anger - when confronted by an angry individual - should use
verbal statements that deactivate anger by negating these input
conditions (see Section 4). In other words, targets of anger should
argue that they hold a high WTR toward the angry individual. This
means that during arguments, the offender should prefer to argue
that:
 Prediction #4: the cost the offender imposed was small.
 Prediction #5: the benefit the offender received as a result of
imposing the cost was large.
 Prediction #6: the offender imposed the cost without knowing it
would be inflicted on the target specifically.
These three predictions are tested across six cultures in Exper-
iment Set C.2. Experiment Set A: What is the effect of the offender’s benefit
on anger?
A vignette with a simple between-subjects experimental design
was used in six populations (US, Australia, Romania, India, Turkey,
and the Shuar of Ecuador) to test prediction #2. In the vignette, a
cost is imposed on the subject. The subject then learns why the
cost was imposed. In the large benefit condition, the offender
received a large benefit for imposing the cost; in the small benefit
condition the offender gained only a small benefit. It is hypothe-sized that subjects will be more angry when they learn that they
were harmed for a small benefit, as this indicates a lower welfare
tradeoff ratio (prediction #2).2.1. Method for Experiments A1–A5
American Subjects (A1): One hundred and nine undergraduates
(72 female) from the University of California, Santa Barbara (UCSB)
participated in Experiment A1 for partial fulfillment of their intro-
ductory psychology course (mean age: 18.3, SD: 0.72, range: 17–
21).
Australian Subjects (A2): Three hundred and twenty-two under-
graduates (239 female) from Griffith University participated in
Experiment A2 for partial fulfillment of their psychology of crime
course (mean age: 21.9, SD: 5.09, range: 17–52).
Romanian Subjects (A3): Three hundred and twenty-eight Roma-
nian students (182 female) from the Universities of Arad, Babes-
Bolyai, Bucharest, and Alexandru Ioan Cuza volunteered to partic-
ipate in Experiment A3 (mean age: 21.0, SD: 2.5, range: 18–37).
There was no monetary compensation.
Indian Subjects (A4): One hundred and fifty-five (49 female) res-
idents of India responded to a survey on the online system
Mechanical Turk (mTurk) in exchange for $0.50 (USD) (mean age:
32.7, SD: 9.5, range: 20–71). A comprehension task was used to
eliminate subjects who did not understand English or were not
paying attention. Forty-nine subjects failed the comprehension
task and were eliminated, leaving a final sample of 106 (26 female;
mean age: 33.6, SD: 10.3, range: 20–71).
Turkish Subjects (A5): Eighty-six Turkish students (60 female)
volunteered to participate in Experiment A5 after being recruited
via social media. Most subjects were students from Bilkent Univer-
sity (mean age: 23.5, SD: 5.6, range: 15–52). There was no mone-
tary compensation.
Procedure. Subjects read a vignette in which a classmate cuts in
line in front of them at a pay phone. As a result of cutting in front of
the subject and making the phone call, the classmate avoids losing
their winning lottery ticket, but the subject misses her bus and has
to wait for the next bus. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of
two conditions: in the large benefit condition the lottery was worth
a large amount of money (for US subjects: $1000); in the small ben-
efit condition the lottery was worth a small amount of money (for
US subjects: $5). Monetary values were chosen by the experi-
menter most familiar with the tested culture to be similar in mag-
nitude to the US amounts.
Materials. The following is the large benefit condition vignette
given to American and Australian males. The sex of all the charac-
ters in the story was matched to the sex of the subject. Indian,
Turkish, and Romanian versions had minor changes, e.g., ‘‘the
classmate” was changed to a work colleague for Indian subjects,
but all changes were held constant across conditions. The names
were always gender-neutral names common in the tested culture.
Table 1
Initial anger scores before learning the offender’s benefit.
US Australia Romania India Turkey
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in the last sentence the value of the lottery ticket was either a
small amount or a large amount of money (e.g. for US subjects












Fig. 2. Effect of offender’s benefit on subject’s anger.2.2. Results and discussion for Experiments A1–A5
Stimulus check: Did the vignette provoke anger?
For the vignette to be appropriate as a stimulus for studying
anger, imagining oneself in the scenario should elicit anger in sub-
jects who do not yet know why the offender pushed them out of
the way. It did. The initial anger ratings—those made before sub-
jects learned why the cost was inflicted—were above the mid-
point of the scale in all five cultures, ranging from a mean of
5.1–6.3 on a 7-point scale (see Table 1). These ratings were made
before the independent variable (the value of the ticket) was intro-
duced and demonstrates that the situation described in the text
was sufficient to elicit anger.
Were subjects more angry when an offender harmed them for a
small benefit rather than a large one? (prediction #2)?
The data strongly support prediction #2 (see Fig. 2). Indepen-
dent samples t-tests showed the change in anger was significantly
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tailed). Effect sizes ranged from d = 0.39 (in Romania) to 1.15
(US). See Table 3, prediction #2, in Section 6. Additional details,
analyses, and controls are reported in the Supplemental Online
Materials.
2.3. Experiment A6: Replication among Shuar foragers in the
Ecuadorian Amazon
The claim that anger has a species-typical design becomes
stronger in proportion to the diversity of cultures tested. Although
the original study and four replications (A1–A5) include popula-
tions from Eastern Europe, Asia Minor, Southern Asia, and two geo-
graphically distant countries from the Anglosphere, the individuals
tested all live in advanced market economies with police and
courts to resolve disputes. Our next test was in a culture that dif-
fers along those dimensions: the Shuar, an indigenous Amazonian
society living in the southeastern neo-tropical forest of Ecuador
(Jandial, Hughes, Aryan, Marshall, & Levy, 2004; Patton, 2005).
The Shuar hunt (with blowguns and shotguns), fish, gather, and
practice slash-and-burn horticulture. Police are not present in
Shuar villages, although they can be called into investigate follow-
ing a homicide. Homicide rates for men are nowmuch lower (Steel,
1999), but they were very high for the ancestors of people alive
today (Patton, 2005). The Shuar have a culture of honor, and inter-
personal conflicts are sometimes settled with the threat or use of
violence. This makes them relevant to hypotheses about anger;
ethnographic and experimental data indicate that people raised
in cultures of honor are more likely to anger in response to per-
ceived slights (Nisbett & Cohen, 1996).
Will anger decrease among Shuar people in response to evi-
dence that the offender gained a large benefit by inflicting a cost
on them, as the welfare tradeoff hypothesis predicts? To find out,
we administered vignettes similar to the one used in A1–A5 to
Shuar people.
2.3.1. Method for Experiment A6
Subjects: Sixty-three adults (32 female) from five Shuar villages
in southeastern Ecuador were read the vignettes and gave verbal
responses (mean age: 30.2, SD: 14.1). Note that ages were available
for only thirty subjects. All subjects were fluent in Spanish, and the
study was conducted in Spanish. Compensation was provided in
the form of public goods donated to the community (e.g., donations
to the medical center) and was not contingent on any individual’s
participation.
Materials. A new vignette was required because many features
of the vignette used in Experiments A1–A5 are unfamiliar to Shuar
villagers. Instead, two vignettes were created: one for Shuar men
and another for Shuar women. The vignettes had the same struc-
ture as in Experiments A1–A5: subjects first learned of a cost
imposed on them, then they learn the magnitude of the benefit
the offender obtained by imposing that cost. The male version
involved a fellow villager borrowing the man’s chainsaw without
asking. The English translation is given below:
Imagine you leave your chainsaw in front of your home before
going to a dinner that was taking place in your village. Your lea-
der invited another group to dinner. You enjoy their company
and have fun during the festivities. When you go back to your
home later that night you see that your chainsaw is missing.
You look around for it, but cannot find it. Then you see one of
the male visitors carrying your chainsaw back to your home.
The chainsaw looks like it has been used.
At this point subjects were asked how angry this would make them:
not angry (1), a little angry (2), angry (3), very angry (4). After
answering, subjects learned that their chainsaw had been taken tocut a fallen tree. In the small benefit condition, this was done for
firewood. In the large benefit condition it was to free the truck that
would take them home. The text read as follows:
You ask him why he took your chainsaw without asking. He
says, ‘‘I needed it to cut a fallen tree [that was blocking the truck
that is taking us home / for some firewood].” Would this state-
ment make you more or less angry?
Subjects then reported their change in anger by verbal response:
much less angry (2), less angry (1), no difference (0), more angry
(1), much more angry (2).
The female version was similar, but involved a cooking pot being
taken in order to make some chicha (a pre-masticated alcoholic
drink from the manioc plant):
Imagine you leave your cooking pot in front of your home
before going to a dinner that was taking place in your village.
Your leader invited another group to dinner. You enjoy their
company and have fun during the festivities. When you go back
to your home later that night you see that your cooking pot is
missing. You look around for it, but cannot find it. Then you
see one of the female visitors carrying your cooking pot back
to your home. The cooking pot looks like it has been used.
After initial anger measures were taken, the subjects learned why
the pot was taken:
You ask her why she took your cooking pot without asking. She
says, ‘‘I needed it to brew some chicha for [the president of the
Shuar Federation / my husband].” Would this statement make
you more or less angry?
The large benefit condition was brewing chicha for the president
(a high prestige individual); the small benefit condition was brew-
ing it for her husband (an everyday activity).
2.3.2. Results and discussion for Experiment A6
Stimulus check: Did the vignettes provoke anger when subjects did
not yet know the offender’s reason? Yes. Average ratings were
approximately 3 out of 4; Shuar men averaged 3.1 (SD 0.94);
women 2.8 (SD 0.98).
Were subjects more angry when an offender harmed them for a
small benefit rather than a large one? (prediction #2)
For women, yes. When Shuar women learned they were harmed
for a large benefit, they reported a large decrease in their anger
compared to when they learned that the benefit to the offender
was small (mean difference: 0.88, t(30) = 2.66, p = 0.01, d = 0.98).
For men, there was no significant difference between condi-
tions, (mean difference: 0.16, t(29) = 0.44, p = 0.67). This is most
likely because we under-estimated the benefit of cutting firewood
(the Shuar cook on wood fires). This benefit may be large enough
that taking the chainsaw does not imply that the offender has a
low welfare tradeoff ratio toward the subject. Follow up interviews
were not conducted, so this explanation is speculative, but there is
some empirical support for it: Shuar men’s anger decreased signif-
icantly (compared to 0) when they learned that the chainsaw was
taken to cut firewood (mean = 0.62, SD = 1.0, t(12) = 2.1,
p = 0.06; d = 1.22). In other words, while the difference between
conditions was not significant, Shuar men did become less angry
when their realized the individual who took their property would
receive a sizeable benefit for having done so.
2.4. Summary and conclusion for Experiments A1–A6
The recalibrational theory proposes that anger is triggered via
cues of another’s low welfare tradeoff ratio. When a cost is
imposed on someone in order to acquire a benefit, the ratio of that
cost to benefit indicates the maximum observed WTR in that
Table 2
Initial anger scores before learning the subject’s lunch was ruined.
US Australia Romania India Turkey
Mean anger (SD) 5.1 (1.53) 4.7 (1.60) 4.5 (1.93) 5.3 (1.68) 5.7 (1.50)
Fig. 3. Effect of specific versus random imposition of costs on anger.
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can be. Thus, when an angry person learns that a cost imposed on
them was done to receive a large benefit, they become less angry
(prediction #2). This general pattern was confirmed across all six
societies (see summary in Table 3).3 These three elements must be known in order for the ratio of the cost imposed to
the benefit gained to accurately indicate the maximum WTR the actor has. However
there are other ways that a cost imposition, even lacking some of these elements
could indicate a low WTR. For example, assuming – reasonably – that humans take
more precautions to avoid imposing costs on valued others, then the accidenta
imposition of a cost would indicate something about the WTR an individual has
toward another, and variables such as the price of the precautionary act, and the
magnitude of the cost imposed would presumably be relevant.3. ‘‘Intentionality” as a cue of WTR engagement
Intentions play a key role in anger. Specifically, unintentional
costs cause less anger than intentional costs (Berkowitz &
Harmon-Jones, 2004; Epstein & Taylor, 1967; Nickel, 1974;
Ohbuchi & Kambara, 1985). For anger to respond to the target’s
intentions, the anger system must perceive cues about what the
actor knew at the time of the offensive act and use them to classify
the act. Many researchers and philosophers defined ‘‘intentional”
in terms of the knowledge of the outcome of an action (e.g.
Forguson, 1989), though the subdivisions of ‘‘outcome” are unclear.
In other words, which aspects of the outcome had to be known for
it to be intentional – the cost, the benefit, the identity of the vic-
tim? Kaufmann (1970) defined an intentional aggressive act as
one which is known by the actor to have a non-zero chance of
inflicting harm on the target, i.e. the actor believed he was impos-
ing a cost. Tedeschi and Felson (1994) defined an intentional act as
‘‘an act performed with the expectation that it will produce a prox-
imate outcome of value to the actor,” i.e. the actor believed she
would attain a benefit. From an evolutionary point of view, the
cues humans use to categorize behavior as intentional or not ought
to depend on the reproductive consequences of using those cues
ancestrally. In short, it will depend on why the concept of ‘‘inten-
tions” evolved (see Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll,
2005).
The recalibrational theory offers a theoretically-derived func-
tional definition of intentions in the context of anger. Specifi-
cally, humans use a specialized computational operation to
determine whether the observed WTR (i.e. the weighting put
on the angry individual in that particular decision) accurately
indicates the real, stable, WTR the target holds toward the angry
individual (i.e. how much weight they would likely put on the
angry person in future decisions). If the observed WTR does
not accurately indicate the individual’s actual WTR then the
behavior will be categorized as ‘‘unintentional” and be less likely
to trigger aggressive bargaining to recalibrate the WTR, though
the angered person may negotiate the target’s perception of
the costs and benefits; e.g., ‘‘that hurt me more than you realize”
(Sell, 2011b).For a cost imposition to accurately indicate a low WTR (see
Fig. 1), three elements must have been known to the person who
imposed the cost at the time the action was taken: (i) the magni-
tude of the cost imposed (Kaufmann, 1970), (ii) the magnitude of
the benefit gained by imposing that cost (Tedeschi & Felson,
1994), and (iii) the identity of the individual on whom the cost
was imposed.3 This last criteria exists because welfare tradeoff
ratios are person-specific, so cost impositions clearly indicate the
actor’s WTR only when the actor knew the cost would be imposed
on that specific person. This leads to prediction #3:
 Prediction #3: Holding the costs and benefits constant, anger
will be more intense when the offender deliberately imposes
the cost on the angry individual as opposed to imposing the cost
without knowing the identity of the recipient.
3.1. Experiments B1–B5: Is knowledge of the victim’s identity a
criterion of intentionality in anger?
Prediction #3 was tested with a short vignette about a practical
joke. The joke involved an insult, with a potential loss of face in
front of the subjects’ classmates or workmates.
3.2. Methods for Experiments B1–B5
American Subjects (B1): Sixty-four undergraduates (43 female)
from UCSB participated in this experiment for partial fulfillment
of their introductory psychology class credit (mean age 18.4, SD
0.85, range: 17–21).
Australian and Romanian Subjects (B2 and B3): The same sub-
jects who participated in experiments A2 and A3 also participated
in B2 and B3. The order of the vignettes and condition were
randomized.
Indian Subjects (B4): The recruitment method used in A4 was
also used for B4. After the language and attention checks, data
remained from eighty-four subjects (29 female, mean age: 31.9,
SD: 9.9).
Turkish Subjects (B5): One hundred and seventy-seven (115
female) students volunteered and completed the survey online
after being recruited from social media (mean age: 22.9, SD: 3.5,
range 18 to 40).
Procedure. Subjects were given a questionnaire about another
student who puts a banana slug in the subject’s lunch during a
class biology trip. In the specific condition, the jokester knewwhose
lunch it was; in the random condition the jokester did not know
whose lunch it was at the time he put the creature in the lunch.
Minor changes were made between cultures, e.g. Romanians are
unfamiliar with banana slugs so a cockroach was used. The name
of the prankster was always a common male name.
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‘‘No.” All other aspects of the vignettes were identical. Subjects
then reported howmuch their anger changed on a Likert scale from
3 (much less) to +3 (much more).4 While intentional acts are much more accurate indicators of someone’s WTR,
there are cues that are perceptible even from acts that strike random targets (see
Footnote 3). Using this example, the prankster risked imposing a cost on the subject –
a risk that was later realized. If he valued the subject’s welfare highly he would have
sought to avoid such risks. He also risked imposing costs on individuals that the
subject might have cared about. Additionally, his actions may indicate that he feels
overly entitled and likely has a deflated WTR toward many individuals, including the
subject. This last reason is presumably why arrogance – particularly when the
arrogant individual is not high status or formidable – is inherently anger-provoking
even in the absence of a particular affront.3.3. Results and discussion of Experiments B1–B5
Stimulus check. For the vignette to be appropriate as a stim-
ulus for studying changes in anger, imagining oneself as the
victim of the prank should elicit anger in subjects who have
not yet learned whether they, specifically, were the target of
the prankster’s joke. It did. Across all samples, the initial anger
measurement was above the midpoint of the scale (see
Table 2).
Did subjects who learned that the insult was not directed at them
in particular feel less anger than those who learned that it was? (pre-
diction #3)
Yes. See Fig. 3. In all five countries, subjects’ anger differed
between the random target condition and the specific target
condition, with generally large effect sizes ranging from
d = 0.63 to 2.6 (see Table 3, prediction #3, in Section 6). In
short, subjects became much more angry when they are
specifically targeted by the prankster. Additional details, anal-
yses, and controls are reported in the Supplemental Online
Materials.3.4. Summary and conclusions for Experiments B1–B5
There is little information from which to infer an actor’s WTR
toward a target if the actor did not know in advance who would
suffer the cost of his actions.4 This predicts that subjects should
be less angry when the actor didn’t know who would be affected
by his actions and more angry when he specifically targeted the
subject (prediction #3). This prediction was confirmed across the
five cultures tested (time constraints associated with the fieldwork
season prevented the planned tests among the Shuar). These
results suggest that people use information about the offender’s
intentions to determine whether the costs inflicted and benefits
gained accurately reflect the offender’s welfare tradeoff ratio
toward them.
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Though rarely empirically studied, arguments are, by far, the
most common behavioral response to anger (Averill, 1982), and
any comprehensive theory of anger must explain the structure
of such arguments. The recalibrational theory holds that argu-
ments are attempts to recalibrate the target’s welfare tradeoff
function as well as other variables relevant to the resolution of
the conflict (e.g., relative value placed on the contested act,
resource, or event). This information exchange during bargaining
has many evolutionary analogs; e.g., animals during conflicts of
interest frequently signal their fighting ability (Enquist, Leimar,
Ljungberg, Mallner, & Segerdahl, 1990; Huntingford & Turner,
1987). Furthermore, some species are known to send signals of
their valuation of a contested resource; e.g., bald eagles raise
their crop to show the distention of their gullet to opponents
when fighting over food (Hansen, 1986), male elephants signal
through visual, auditory, and olfactory channels their musth-
state (i.e., reproductive state) to demonstrate the high value they
place on a contested female (Poole, 1989). While eagles signal
their hunger via a different channel than a human bargaining
over whether she is to be allowed to take the day off of work,
the conceptual grammar of the message is identical: ‘‘I value this
highly, and therefore you should cede the resource to me.” Such
an argument will sometimes recalibrate the opponent and lead
to the resolution of the conflict in favor of the arguer without
any escalation to overt aggression, e.g., bald eagles that see the
empty stomach of their opponent are more likely to relinquish
the food (Hansen, 1986), and larger non-musth elephants will
often defer to smaller elephants who are in a musth state
(Poole, 1989). This indicates that favorable outcomes in such
bargaining are not just based on a superior ability to inflict costs,
but that the more formidable animal must also take into account
how much effort his or her adversary will be designed to invest
in obtaining or defending the resource based on differential
valuation.
Thus, humans – like other animals – should be well designed
to manipulate perceptions of a conflict in their own favor. Indeed,
the design in humans is likely much more sophisticated than
non-humans because of our uniquely complex communication
system (i.e. language) and richness of representation. Specifically,
the human mind is predicted to be equipped with mechanisms
that come online when an individual is the target of anger and
function to deactivate the other person’s anger mechanism. The
existence of this mechanism is supported by research showing
specialized perceptual systems that respond to the anger face
(Feldmann-Wustefeld, Schmidt-Daffy, & Schubo, 2011; Öhman
et al., 2001). Furthermore, the structure of the anger-disabling
strategies can be predicted from the form of the anger system
itself, and thus provide testable hypotheses about the recalibra-
tional theory. For example, one way to deactivate anger is to
allow it to fulfill its function and recalibrate one’s welfare tradeoff
function toward the angry individual. We hypothesize that apolo-
gies are an evolved response that work via this route, but we do
not address specific predictions from this perspective in this
paper.Another way to deactivate anger is to counteract its input
conditions. If A and B trigger anger, then convincing angry indi-
viduals of not-A and not-B would mitigate the costs of anger by
essentially turning it off. Predictions 1–3 relate to the trigger of
anger in the angry individual, and thus each produces a con-
verse prediction in the target of anger. When confronted by
an angry individual on whom one has imposed a cost, targets
of anger should favor statements consistent with holding a high
WTR toward the angry individual. Specifically, offenders should
argue that:
 Prediction #4: the cost the offender imposed was small.
 Prediction #5: the benefit the offender received as a result of
imposing the cost was large.
 Prediction #6: the offender imposed the cost on an individual
whose identity was not represented in advance.
4.1. Experiments C1–C6: When confronted with another’s anger, do
subjects prefer arguments that demonstrate they have a high WTR
toward the angry individual?
In Experiments C1–C6, American, Australian, Romanian, Indian,
Turkish, and Shuar subjects were asked to imagine that they had
provoked anger in another person. Subjects were then asked to
select arguments they would make if they wanted to convince that
person that what they had done was not so bad as to warrant
anger.
4.2. Methods for Experiment C1–C5
American Subjects (C1): Fifty-six undergraduates (35 female) at
UCSB participated for partial fulfillment of their introductory psy-
chology class credit (mean age 18.2, SD = 0.54).
Australian Subjects (C2): One hundred and forty-eight (115
female) undergraduate students at Griffith University participated
for course credit (mean age 21.5, SD: 4.3).
Romanian Subjects (C3): Forty-two undergraduates (39 female)
from the University of West Timisoara volunteered to participate
(mean age 23.1, SD = 6.35).
Indian Subjects (C4): The recruitment method used in A4 was
also used for C4. After language checks data remained from
eighty-five subjects (33 female; mean age: 32.9, SD: 8.9).
Turkish Subjects (C5): The same subjects who participated in
Experiment B5 participated in C5. The order of the scenarios and
arguments were randomized.
Procedure. Subjects were given a questionnaire that con-
tained three scenarios. For each scenario, subjects were asked
to imagine that they had inflicted a cost on someone else to
gain a benefit for themselves. They were presented with a list
of arguments that they could make on their own behalf, and
asked to rate each one.
Materials. Subjects received instructions followed by the scenar-
ios. The instructions and a sample scenario follow. In brackets we
show the theoretical categories for each argument; these did not
appear in the stimuli.
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listed above, there was one in which the subject talks on the phone
instead of busing tables while at work, angering a co-worker. In
another, the subject steals prescription drugs from a pharmacy,
angering the owner of the pharmacy.
Subjects were asked to choose statements that would help their
case if they wanted to argue that what they did was not ‘‘that bad.”
This wording was chosen to explore intuitions about welfare trade-
offs - in contrast to apologies which are often accompanied by
admissions, e.g., ‘‘I understand I hurt you a lot. . .” The order of
the statements was counter-balanced across subjects and
scenarios.4.3. Results and discussion for Experiments C1–C5
Ratings for statements about the size of costs and benefits are
averaged over the three scenarios. Statements about random versus
specific victims were presented in only one scenario (not knowing
the victim’s identity was plausible in the sweater scenario above,
but not in the others). Due to a programming error, data on random
vs. specific victims were unavailable for Turkish subjects (C5).
Which arguments do subjects prefer when confronted with anger?
Results are shown in Fig. 4. Predictions #4–6 hold that subjects
will prefer arguments indicating that their welfare tradeoff ratio
toward the angry individual is high and spurn arguments that indi-
5 We note that such patterns may also function to sway third parties (see
McCullough, Kurzban, & Tabak, 2013). The presence of third parties complicates these
analyses as well, particularly around issues of shame (Sznycer, De Smet et al., 2016)
For example, in physical contests of strength men will often insist that the opponen
did not hurt them greatly, e.g. ‘‘I barely felt it when you punched me.” Bringing in
additional psychological adaptations complicates the analysis of arguments, but in
ways that make sense with the consideration of each additional system. The data
presented here were elicited specifically to look at cases of anger in which one
individual imposes a cost on another to receive a benefit and argues with the angry
person that their behavior was acceptable.
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comparing ratings of each statementwith its opposite (e.g. high cost
statements were compared to low cost statements). All predictions
were confirmed; effect sizes were very high (ranging from d = 1.2
to 8.0) and invariantly significant (see Table 3 in Section 6). Keep
in mind that this experiment was done within subjects, meaning
that subjects likely rated the arguments against their opposite (e.g.
recognizing that the small cost statement was better than its com-
plementary large cost statement). This may have inflated the effect
sizes, but could not have produced the pattern of effects unless sub-
jects truly preferred high WTR statements to lowWTR statements.
4.4. Experiment C6: Replication among the Shuar of Ecuador
Predictions #4 and #5 were also tested among the Shuar. Two
scenarios were read to subjects in which they impose a cost on a
neighbor. Subjects then rated arguments they could make in their
own defense.
4.4.1. Methods for Experiment C6
Subjects: Ninety subjects (50 female) from five Shuar villages
were read one of two vignettes (mean age: 33.12, SD: 13.0,
n = 52). Note that ages were available for only 52 of the 90 subjects.
See Experiment A6 for more detail.
Procedure and Materials: Subjects were read one of two scenar-
ios, chosen at random. In one, the subject’s dog attacked their
neighbor’s chickens; in the other, the subject failed to purchase
some medicine for their neighbor. Because the same subject pool
was also used for Experiment D6, each subject was read only one
scenario for Experiment C6 and the other for Experiment D6.
The first scenario is given below:
Imagine you had to tie up your dog because your dog was killing
chickens in your neighborhood. One day you come home and
find that your dog attacked your neighbor’s chickens. When
you meet your friend, he is very angry about what your dog
did. Your friend complains to you about it. You feel you have
a good reason for not tying your dog.
Subjects then responded to a series of statements that they could
say to their friend. They were asked to indicate how they would
respond to their friend. They rated each statement as follows: very
poor statement (2), poor statement (1), no difference (0), good
statement (1), very good statement (2). The statements were:
At least the dog only disturbed the chickens but didn’t kill them.
[small cost to friend]
The dog only killed one chicken. [small cost to friend]
The dog only killed ten chickens. [large cost to friend]
I let the dog go free because I had to use the rope for my ham-
mock. [small benefit for subject]
I had to untie the dog because there was a jaguar near my
house. [large benefit for subject]
4.4.2. Results and discussion for Experiment C6
Results were similar to those from the other five cultures (see
Table 3 in Section 6). Consistent with prediction #4, subjects pre-
ferred statements indicating that they had imposed only a small
cost on their neighbor over statements that they imposed a large
cost, mean difference = 1.20, SD = 1.07, paired samples t(89)
= 10.65, p = 1016, d = 2.3. Prediction #5 was also confirmed for
Shuar subjects: Shuar preferred to argue that they benefited
greatly by imposing the cost rather than benefiting only a little
(mean difference = 0.67, SD = 1.30, paired samples t(89) = 4.92,
p = 0.000004, d = 1.0). As with subjects from other countries, Shuar
subjects preferred arguments consistent with holding a high WTR
toward the individual they had harmed.4.5. Summary and conclusions for Experiment Set C
Experiments C1–C6 demonstrate that subjects prefer
arguments suggesting that their action was consistent with their
having a high welfare tradeoff ratio toward the angry individual.
This general pattern was found reliably across all tested
societies. In conclusion, subjects’ argument preferences appear
well-designed to deactivate an anger system that is triggered by
indications of a low welfare tradeoff ratio.55. Experiment Set D: Replication and converging evidence -
Which arguments actually lessen anger?
Experiment Set D serves as the mirror image of Experiment Set
C. It is designed to provide converging evidence for the hypotheses
tested in Experiment Sets A and B, as well as to test whether sub-
jects’ preferred arguments from Experiment Set C actually diffuse
anger. They are predicted to: if anger-based arguments involve
dueling perceptions about variables that reveal WTRs, then those
arguments preferred by subjects in Experiment Set C should lower
anger if believed by the angry individual they are directed at.
In Experiments D1–D6, American, Australian, Romanian, Indian,
Turkish, and Shuar subjects were given the scenarios used in
Experiments C1–C6, but instead of the subject being the person
who imposed the cost, the text was rewritten so that the subject
was the person on whom the cost was imposed. Subjects were then
asked to rate the arguments from Experiment Set C to indicate
which would exacerbate their anger and which would diminish
their anger. This design also allows us to replicate predictions 1–3.
Anger should be exacerbated by information implying that the cost
imposed was large, the benefit gained by the offender small, and
the identity of the victim known (see Table 3 in Section 6).5.1. Methods for Experiments D1–D5
American Subjects (D1): Sixty-four undergraduates (43 female)
from UCSB participated for partial fulfillment of their introductory
psychology class credit (mean age 18.4, SD = 0.85).
Australian Subjects (D2): One hundred and seventy-four under-
graduates (124 female) from Griffith University participated for
partial course credit (mean age 22.2, SD = 5.7).
Romanian Subjects (D3): Forty-seven undergraduates (28
female) from the University of West Timisoara volunteered to par-
ticipate (mean age: 20.1, SD = 3.32).
Indian Subjects (D4): The recruitment method used in A4 was
also used for D4. After language checks, data remained from
eighty-nine subjects (33 female; mean age: 33.4, SD: 8.92).
Turkish Subjects (D5): The same subjects who participated in
Experiment A4 participated in D4. The order of the scenarios and
arguments were randomized.
Materials. Subjects were given a questionnaire that contained
three scenarios based on those in Experiments C1–C5. These sce-
narios were rewritten so that the subject was the person on whom
the cost was imposed. The example from Experiment C1 is shown
here in rewritten form:.
t
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sible statements from Experiment C1 that could pertain to the
story (the statements were rewritten when necessary to maintain
the role of the subject as the person on whom the cost was
imposed). Subjects rated the statements from 3 (definitely makes
me less angry) to +3 (definitely makes me more angry).
5.2. Results and discussion for Experiments D1–D5
Results are shown in Fig. 5. Data were analyzed by paired sam-
ples t-tests comparing the facts of each type to their opposite (e.g.
large cost statements across scenarios compared to small cost
statements across scenarios). In sum, indications that the offender
had a low welfare tradeoff ratio toward the subject made them
more angry in every tested culture. Specifically, subjects were
more angry when they learned the cost imposed on themwas large
rather than small (prediction #1), the benefit gained by the offen-
der was small rather than large (prediction #2), and that the offen-
der knowingly imposed the cost on the subject in particular rather
than at random (#3). Effects were very large (ranging from d = 1.6to 6.9) and highly significant in every tested culture (see Table 3 in
Section 6, predictions #1-#3). We note that, as in Experiment Set C,
these data were gathered within-subjects, which may result in lar-
ger effect sizes.
5.3. Experiment D6: Replication among the Shuar of Ecuador
Experiments D1–D5 were replicated among the Shuar using the
rewritten materials from Experiment C6.
5.3.1. Methods for Experiment D6
Subjects: Fifty-two subjects (30 female) from five Shuar villages
were read one of two vignettes, mean age: 33.29, SD: 12.0, n = 31.
Note that ages were only available for 31 of the 52 subjects. See
Experiment A6 for more detail.
Materials: One of two scenarios was read to each subject. In
each, the subject’s neighbor imposed a cost on them. Because the
same subjects also participated in Experiment C6, the scenario read
to them in D6 was not the scenario read to them in C6. The struc-
ture of the scenarios was the same as Experiments D1–D5.
Fig. 5. Which statements assuage or exacerbate another’s anger?
Fig. 4. Which arguments do targets of anger prefer?
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ten so that the subject was the victim—that is, the person who
owned the chickens. The sex of the friend in the scenario was
matched to the subject. The other scenario (female version) is
given below. (In C6, the subject was the person traveling to town
rather than the one who wanted medicine).
Imagine a friend is making a trip into town to purchase some
goods. You need some medicine and you ask your friend to
buy the medicine for you. Your friend agrees to buy you the
medicine and you give your friend $20 to buy it.Your friend goes to town and buys her goods. She comes back to
the village without the medicine. You are very angry that she
did not buy the medicine.
You complain to your friend that she didn’t buy the medicine.
She feels she has a good reason for not getting the medicine.
What can she tell you to make you less angry?
Subjects then indicated how their anger would be affected by a
series of statements: much less angry (2), less angry (1), no dif-















124 A. Sell et al. / Cognition 168 (2017) 110–128Your fever is gone now anyway. [small cost to you]
The nurse will be here tomorrow with the medicine anyway.
[small cost to you]
A medical brigade will be here next month with the medicine.
[large cost to you]
Your fever will be gone in three weeks anyway. [large cost to
you]
I didn’t get the medicine because I spent the $20 on beer. [small
benefit gained by the offender]
I didn’t get the medicine because I hurt my leg very badly with a
machete and I had to use the $20 for the doctor. [large benefit
gained by the offender]
I didn’t get the medicine because the store was closed for the
day, so I would have had to stay in town until the next day,
and I didn’t have money to stay the night there [large benefit
gained by the offender]5.3.2. Results and discussion for Experiment D6
Results replicated the pattern found among American, Aus-
tralian, Romanian, Turkish, and Indian subjects. Averaged across
statement types and both vignettes, Shuar subjects calibrated their
anger to the magnitude of the cost imposed on them, becoming
more angry when confronted with high cost statements
(M = 0.32, SD = 1.37) and much less angry in response to low cost
statements (M = 1.25, SD = 0.62). The difference between them
was highly significant, paired samples t(52) = 7.77, p = 108,
d = 2.1. Consistent with prediction #2, anger decreased much more
when the benefit gained by the offender was large (M = 1.04,
SD = 0.82) rather than small (M = 0.24, SD = 0.87), paired samples
t(51) = 4.71, p = 0.00002, d = 1.3.
5.4. Summary and conclusions for Experiment Set D
The results of Experiments D1–D6 demonstrated that subjects
in Set C were correct: The statements offenders (those in Experi-
ment Set C) thought would strengthen their case were precisely
the same kinds of statements that made victims (those in Experi-
ment Set D) less angry. Moreover, the statements that Set C sub-
jects thought would weaken their case were exactly those that
made Set D subjects more angry (see also Sznycer, Schniter,
Tooby, & Cosmides, 2015; Sznycer, De Smet et al., 2016). Further-
more, the results of Experiment Sets A and B were replicated.
Across six cultures, subjects became more angry when the cost
imposed on them was large rather than small, when the offenderle 3
dictions and summary of effect sizes (Cohen’s d) across Experiments A through D.
Experiment set: Effect size d
redictions US Australia
ubjects are more angry when:
1 larger costs imposed on them D: 6.9*** D: 6.1***
2 smaller benefits gained by offender A: 1.2*** A: 0.82***
D: 6.9*** D: 5.5***
3 they are specifically targeted by offender B: 2.6*** B: 1.9***
D: 2.4*** D: 2.7***
argets of anger argue:
4: ‘‘I imposed a small cost” C: 6.9*** C: 5.1***
5: ‘‘I did it for a large benefit” C: 6.9*** C: 8.0***
6: ‘‘I didn’t impose cost on you in particular” C: 5.5*** C: 3.0***
p < 0.05, two-tailed.
p < 0.01, two-tailed.
p < 0.001, two-tailed.gained a smaller rather than a larger benefit, and when the offen-
der had specifically targeted them. Taken together, the results
show that cost impositions that imply that the offender’s welfare
tradeoff ratio is low trigger anger.6. General results and discussion
Six predictions were derived from the recalibrational theory’s
account of how anger is triggered and scaled by cost-inflictions.
All hypotheses were supported across a range of cultures (see
Table 3). Collectively, the experiments presented herein support
the view that anger is reliably evoked when information reveals
that another individual holds too low a welfare tradeoff ratio
toward the angry person.6.1. Anger and arguments
This data also support a theoretical framework in which anger-
based arguments can be understood as attempts by each individual
to modify the perceptions of their interlocutor in ways that allow
recalibration of their respective anger and welfare tradeoff func-
tions. The data indicate that the targets of anger – when prompted
to defend their actions rather than apologize – will deploy argu-
ments designed to demonstrate a high WTR toward the angry indi-
vidual. This account is also consistent with prior research and
theorizing on intentional harms, e.g., individuals are predicted to
argue that they did not know that the magnitude of the cost they
imposed would be so large (see Kaufmann, 1970). Unlike previous
accounts, this explanation can be derived directly from the evolu-
tionary functional logic of the theory: an individual who intended
to impose a smaller cost may have a high WTR toward the individ-
ual on whom the cost was imposed because the WTR – by defini-
tion – delineates acceptable cost-benefit transactions.
The structure of anger-based arguments will also depend heav-
ily on the triggering conditions of anger, because the variables that
indicate a low WTR will depend on the mental structure that
leaked information about the WTR. This paper employed the most
common trigger of anger: a cost infliction that embodied too low a
WTR. However, others exist and will need to have their computa-
tional structure mapped separately. For example, information
about a person’s WTR can leak through their estimates of WTR-
calibrating factors such as formidability, cooperative value, attrac-
tiveness, and so forth (Preston & Kimberley, 1987; Sell et al., 2009;
Sell et al., 2016).Romania India Turkey Shuar
D: 3.0*** D: 1.9*** D: 4.4*** D: 2.1***
A: 0.39*** A: 0.52* A: 0.52* A: n.s.(m)
D: 4.1*** D: 1.6*** D: 5.5*** A: 0.98(f)**
D: 1.3***
B: 1.1*** B: 0.63** B: 1.5*** Not tested
D: 2.5*** D: 1.8*** D: 1.8***
C: 2.0*** C: 1.3*** C: 2.7*** C: 2.3***
C: 4.1*** C: 2.1*** C: 5.5*** C: 1.0***
C: 1.6*** C: 1.2*** Not tested Not tested
6 The extent to which another individual benefits from your presence and your
cooperation is a component of cooperative value and association value (see Petersen
et al., 2012; Sell et al., 2009; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996) and thus contributes to
bargaining power. As such, an individual who underestimates the extent to which
they depend on another can expect to trigger anger in that individual, which
functions to recalibrate their estimates of cooperative value or association value and
thus increase WTR.
7 Indeed, we designed different vignettes for the Shuar precisely because differen
resources are valued across cultures. While we expect cultural calibration of costs and
benefits, the universal functional grammar is predicted (by the recalibrational theory
to be the same, and the experiments presented here offer evidence to that effect.
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about WTRs, arguments can sometimes indicate a high WTR
through one channel but low WTR through another. For example,
anger can be triggered by a cooperative partner’s willingness to
replace you with another; this is because WTRs toward friends
and romantic partners are indicated –- in part – by one’s estima-
tion of the longevity of the relationship – ‘‘I will love you until July”
is a weaker signal of WTR than ‘‘I will love you forever” (Tooby &
Cosmides, 1996). More simply, anger can be triggered by an indica-
tion that a loved one is considering leaving you. Therefore, if a man
were caught cheating on his wife, and she confronted him, her
anger can be triggered by two simultaneous channels: one, she is
angry because he indicated a willingness to replace her with
another woman, and two, she is angry because he engaged in an
act that imposed a large cost on her for a relatively small benefit.
The man could counter the cost-infliction channel by claiming that
the benefit he received for imposing that cost was very large (e.g.,
‘‘But she was so beautiful. . .”) but this simultaneously intensifies
the signal through the other channel, i.e., it indicates that he is
more likely to replace his wife with the other woman. On the other
hand, he could counter the jealousy-channel of anger by claiming
that the other woman meant nothing, and was unattractive, but
this would intensify the cost-infliction channel by indicating that
he decided to impose this painful cost on his wife for a trivial ben-
efit. The existence of these multiple effects on anger is crucially
important because they present a difficult – possibly insurmount-
able – problem for theories of anger based on associationism (see
Berkowitz, 1990). This is because the anger mechanism responds
in two different contradictory ways to the same piece of informa-
tion, e.g. the husband claiming his lover was attractive. This fact
cannot be modeled as an association between that information
and the triggering of anger.
6.2. Alternative theories of anger
While many of the results documented in this paper conform to
intuition, it is worth noting that they are – in their totality - incon-
sistent with a number of theoretical approaches to anger.
6.2.1. Equity theory
Equity theory was proposed as a general theory of human
behavior that could be applied to many domains of human life
(Berkowitz & Walster, 1976; Walster, Berscheid, & Walster,
1973). Later, Donnerstein and Hatfield (1982) tested the fit
between data on anger and aggression and the predictions derived
from equity theory with mixed results (for a related explanation
see Relative Deprivation Theory, e.g. Smith & Pettigrew, 2015).
Equity theory, as applied to anger, predicts that anger is designed,
to some extent, to make outcomes more equitable between the
angry individual and the target of anger. Those who are ‘‘under
benefited” inflict costs on those who are ‘‘over benefited” in order
to even out the inequality. This predicts that the more a person
benefited as a result of imposing a cost, the more angry the victim
should feel, e.g., if someone imposed a cost of 5 in order to receive
5 then the inequality is 10; while if they imposed the same cost to
receive a benefit of 2 the inequality would be only 7.
Thus, the equity theory account of anger would predict a posi-
tive relationship between anger and the benefit the offender
received as a result of the offense. These hypotheses are the oppo-
site of predictions #2 and #5 and are contradicted by data from US,
Australian, Romanian, Turkish, Indian, and Shuar subjects as docu-
mented in Experiment Sets A, C, and D.
Finally, the recalibrational theory predicts that anger will be
caused by inequality only when the bargaining power of the two
parties is equal. It can predict anger even in the beneficiary of an
unequal welfare tradeoff where the relative bargaining power‘‘entitles” her or him to an even more unequal tradeoff. This does
not demonstrate that equity has no role in anger (we believe that
it does), nor do the data demonstrate that an individual cannot
become angry when another benefits greatly from a relationship
while the angry individual benefits little.6 Rather, the data show
that equity theory cannot account for the cognitive structure of
anger when it comes to one-shot cost impositions or the arguments
that they generate.
6.2.2. Social constructivism and cultural calibration
Classic work on the design of anger-based argumentation
(Averill, 1982, 1983) laid bare rich detail to these social interac-
tions that contradicted the simplistic animal models of early
aggression theories, e.g. the frustration-aggression model
(Berkowitz, 1988; Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939),
and drive-reduction theory (Hull, 1943). The complex nature of
the arguments was ascribed to social products that serve social
functions, ‘‘emotions serve a function within the social system, or
at least are correlated with other behaviors that have a social func-
tion,” (Averill, 1983, p. 1146). While the hypothesis that culture
generates the major features of the anger system without the guid-
ance of evolved design has been largely discarded (though see
Barrett, 2017; Barrett & Russell, 2014), anger is – nonetheless – cal-
ibrated by culturally-varying features of the social ecology
(Matsumoto, Hee Yoo, Nakagawa, & 37 Members of the
Multinational Study of Cultural Display Rules, 2008; Scherer &
Brosch, 2009). This leaves the possibility that culturally variant,
or perhaps even universal, features of anger could have been the
product of cultural evolution that serves a societal benefit.7
Against that view, the data presented in this paper adds to a
body of research showing that the underlying computational archi-
tecture of anger triggers is plausibly universal to the species
(Alonso-Arbiol et al., 2011; Scherer & Wallbott, 1994; Wallbott &
Scherer, 1986). These results undermine models of social construc-
tivism that lead to the expectation that there will be high variance
across cultures in the underlying dynamics of anger.
Importantly, predictions #3 and #6 – which show that anger is
more likely to be elicited when an offender intends to impose a
cost specifically on the angry individual – appear contrary to what
one would predict from theories of anger that suggest that the pro-
cesses of anger have their origins in social consensus, social learn-
ing, cultural inheritance, or norm enforcement. This is because
angry individuals and third parties appear to have opposite
responses to an offender targeting the victim (i.e. the angry person)
in particular. On one hand, offenders who target at random are
considered more worthy of punishment by third parties (Miller,
Rossi, & Simpson, 1991), a pattern with real world effects, e.g.
criminals who randomly target their victims are more likely to
be prosecuted, more likely to be convicted, and more likely to be
executed for their crimes (Dawson, 2004; Hessick, 2007; Simon,
1996). On the other hand, despite this widespread norm of justice,
individuals on whom costs are imposed are less likely to be
angered if the offender targeted them at random, as shown in
Experiment Sets B and D and as predicted by the recalibrational
theory. In short, this particular aspect of anger – being less angryt
)
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norm because the norm is the opposite of this.
6.3. Anger and other emotions
Anger is not the only emotion that has been posited to calibrate
and respond to welfare tradeoff ratios (see Sznycer, Cosmides, &
Tooby, 2017; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008, for gratitude, compassion,
guilt, shame, and pride, for example). Maintaining optimal concern
for others’ welfare would have been a powerful selection pressure,
and there are likely many evolved mechanisms that govern how
humans process information and behave in welfare tradeoff trans-
actions. For example, gratitude is the complementary emotion to
anger: When others treat one unexpectedly well, gratitude upreg-
ulates the welfare tradeoff ratio to reinforce a higher level of
mutual cooperation (Lim, 2012; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008). Simi-
larly, reverse engineering the features of guilt suggests that it is
an adaptation for recalibrating one’s own welfare tradeoff ratio
toward another (Tooby & Cosmides, 2008) when one imposes
undue costs on a valued other. This will sometimes co-occur with
another’s anger, e.g. you forget to pick up a friend at the airport.
Guilt can function to recalibrate WTRs in the absence of another’s
anger though, e.g. you leave your baby in the hot car because you
are busy talking on your phone, then return to a crying red-faced
baby who is overjoyed to see their rescuer with no knowledge that
it was – in fact – your fault that they are suffering.
Shame, a related emotion, may also co-occur with another’s
anger. Shame orchestrates cognition and behavior to minimize (i)
the likelihood that negative information about an individual (e.g.
stinginess, incompetence) reaches other people’s minds, and (ii)
the extent of any ensuing decrease in others’ WTRs with respect
to the individual (Sznycer, 2010; see also Fessler, 1999). Shame
defends the individual against information-triggered devaluation
(e.g. by motivating the destruction of incriminating evidence)
whether others are seen as deserving higher WTRs or not (whether
guilt is also mobilized or not). Recent findings indicate a close
match between the intensity of shame in the discredited individual
and the adverse reaction of the audience (Sznycer, De Smet et al.,
2016), suggesting that these emotions are informed by the same
underlying welfare-tradeoff architecture (see also Sznycer, Al-
Shawaf et al., 2017; Sznycer et al., 2015; Sznycer, Tooby et al.
2016).
6.4. Conclusion
In this paper, six predictions were derived from the recalibra-
tional theory’s account of how the infliction of costs can trigger
anger. These predictions were confirmed and replicated across
six diverse cultures ranging from very peaceful (Australians) to
one of the more violent (the Shuar of Ecuador). In all cases, the con-
ceptual grammar of anger appeared to be the same: cost inflictions
trigger anger when they indicate welfare tradeoff ratios that are
too low. Furthermore, in all tested cultures, when confronted with
anger, individuals deployed arguments designed to indicate that
their WTR toward the angry individual was high, and shunned
arguments that indicated that their WTR was low. Future research
will determine whether other triggers of anger can be equally
explained and predicted from this model.
In conclusion, there are good theoretical reasons to believe that
evolution by natural selection provides the underlying functional
logic that explains how anger works. The exquisitely detailed,
functionally interlocking characteristics of the species-typical
physiological/anatomical architecture of anger – the universal
facial expression of anger, the coordinated changes in physiological
and perceptual systems – appear to be complemented by a com-
plex computational architecture organized to perceive cues ofWTRs, calculate intentions with respect to welfare outcomes, com-
pute levels of entitlement, deploy arguments, trigger threats and
acts of aggression, tactically withdraw cooperation, and otherwise
regulate psychological variables and behavioral outputs in ways
that led to self-beneficial bargaining resolutions of conflicts. This
complexity – if it is indeed the result of natural selection – can
be mapped and understood if we know what evolutionary function
it served. The recalibrational theory offers one parsimonious func-
tional explanation that unites these diverse phenomena into a uni-
fied system.
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